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Abstract The supply of information, particularly of bad news, in an agency relation-
ship is a sensitive issue. We employ a game theory approach to investigate conflicts
in the particular case of the doctor–patient relationship when information affects the
emotions of patients. The doctor does not know the type of agent and the patient does
not know how much information he is given. Hence, the paper obtains results when
there is conflict, rather than common interest in the objectives of the two parties. The
perfect Bayesian equilibrium describes beliefs and strategies which guarantee adher-
ence to the doctor’s recommendation. We show also that the patient may non-adhere
to the recommendation not only when the doctor fails to identify the patient’s needs
but also if he falsely believes that the doctor has not done so.
Keywords Doctor–patient relationship · Adherence · Psychological expected utility ·
Non-cooperative game theory · Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
JEL Classification D03 · I10 · C72
1 Introduction
Theoretical investigations of the doctor–patient interaction shed light on aspects of
this relationship that empirical work cannot do. Emotions and feelings experienced
when information is communicated makes this interaction particularly complex and the
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empirical attempts to understand it even more complicated. Yet, the understanding of
this interaction has become particularly important and it is vital in explaining patients’
decisions to non-adhere to medical recommendations (Osterberg and Blaschke 2005).
This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the medical consultation when
information affects the emotions of the patient and both the doctor and the patient
operate in an uncertain environment. Our paper contributes to a limited literature in this
area of health economics, extending our previous research on the topic (Glycopantis
and Stavropoulou 2011). In that paper, we investigate the case when there is uncertainty
only on the part of the doctor.
Our investigation is motivated by two facts. First, patients vary in their preferences
regarding information; some prefer detailed information, while others are better off
when they do not receive much information about their health states (Miller and Man-
gan 1983). Second, information exchange during the consultation affects decisions
made by the two parties and can have an impact on adherence to medical recommen-
dations (Lambert and Loiselle 2007).
We use a non-cooperative game theory model to explain how uncertainty and con-
flict in the doctor–patient relation are resolved in an equilibrium which depends on
the attitudes (types) of the two agents and their beliefs. In our model, patients vary in
their preferences for information. The doctor does not know how much information
the patient wants and the patient cannot tell with certainty how much effort the doctor
has expended and how much information she passed on to him. Ultimately, our paper
aims to understand under which conditions, adherence to medical recommendations
can be achieved. We consider both the cases where the patient simply reacts optimally
to the decision of the doctor and when the decisions are interdependent.
Our analysis shows that a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) requires that the
doctor correctly predicts the type of patient, but also that the patient correctly believes
that the doctor provided the information he wants. This result has policy implications
with respect to how trust can be built up between the two parties to improve adherence.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the assumptions of
the model and considers the imperfect information case referring to both the doctor and
the patient. Section 3 considers the implications of the analysis. Section 4 concludes
the discussion.
2 The model
2.1 Preliminary remarks
This section presents a non-cooperative game to describe the interaction between a
doctor (‘she’) and a patient (‘he’) when information affects the patient’s emotions and
this impacts on the decisions made by the two parties.
The patient can be one of two types, i.e. information-loving or information-averse.
Following Miller’s terminology, patients are called monitors (M) or blunters (B),
respectively (Miller 1987). The patients are chosen by Nature (N ).
The doctor diagnoses that given the recommended treatment, the patient’s state
of health in Period 2 will deteriorate to s1 with probability q or will improve to s2
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with 1 − q. We assume that the diagnosis is correct. The expected state of health is
E[s] = q × s1 + (1 − q) × s2.
The doctor can decide to give full details (T ), i.e. reveal the probabilities with which
the patient’s health can deteriorate or improve. Or she can avoid revealing the whole
picture (N T ) and simply tell him that his expected state of health will be E[s]. We
register through 1 > 0 the effort the doctor needs to expend to pass on the information
to the blunter and 2 > 0 the effort for the more persistent monitor. Both are constants
and are subtracted from the doctor’s utility when the doctor decides to play T . We
assume that 1 < 2, following literature, which suggests that monitors are more
’difficult’ (Miksanek 2008) and more demanding (Miller 1995).
The patient will decide whether to accept the information and adhere (A) or not
(N A). If he non-adheres a constant l ≥ 0 is subtracted from his utility, denoting the
loss in health if he does not follow the medical recommendation. This constant is
common for all types of patients. If a patient decides to ignore the doctor’s advice,
despite the fact that full information is provided, then he assumes that his state of
health is E[s] and acts accordingly.
The analysis takes into account a number of other emotions that affect the interac-
tion. We register through a > 0 the anger that is experienced if a monitor realizes that
the doctor has not told him all the truth. It is subtracted both from the monitor’s and the
doctor’s utility. It is assumed that a > 2. This tends to make the doctor more careful
in expending effort to make her recommendation. Finally, w > 0 registers the worry
that a monitor experiences if he decides to follow the doctor’s advice even though he
has realized that he has not been told the truth.
We use as our tool of analysis the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE)
of non-cooperative, extensive form games. It consists of a set of players’ optimal
behavioural strategies, and consistent with these, a set of beliefs which attach a prob-
ability distribution to the nodes of each information set. Consistency requires that the
decision from an information set is optimal given the particular player’s beliefs and the
strategies from all other sets. If the optimal play of the game enters an information set
then, using the available information, updating of beliefs must be Bayesian. Otherwise
appropriate beliefs are assigned arbitrarily.
Beliefs are particularly important when a player does not know precisely at which
node in the game he is. Therefore, he will make the same decision from all nodes in
an information set.
In an equilibrium, neither the doctor nor the patient would want to deviate from it.
On the other hand, there is no reason why the original decisions might not deviate from
the equilibrium. In that case it is important to consider whether repeated consultations
will result in adherence.
It is important to show that the expected outcome is implemented through a PBE.
In a series of papers Glycopantis et al. (2001, 2003, 2005, 2009) discuss, in the
context of economies with asymmetric information, the implementation (support) of
both Walrasian and pure game concepts. The cooperative concept of the private core
can be given a dynamic interpretation as a PBE of a non-cooperative extensive-form
game.
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2.2 The utility functions
Recent attempts to enrich economic models with elements from psychology include
the development of psychological expected utility (PEU) by Caplin and Leahy (2001).
This has been used in analysing the doctor–patient interaction (Caplin and Leahy 2004;
Köszegi 2004, 2006). However, they confine themselves to models of perfect agency.
The utility functions in our models are similar to the ones developed by Köszegi
(2003). They reflect preferences of individuals regarding earlier or later resolution of
uncertainty. We interpret the PEU, not as lotteries over health states, as in the von
Neumann–Morgenstern specification, but as preferences over knowing these possible
events. The beliefs over future health states distinguish a monitor from a blunter.
In Period 1, the present, the patient needs to decide whether to follow the doctor’s
advice according to what he believes his health will be in period 2, the future.
For a blunter, the utility function, u B(s) > 0, is increasing and strictly concave,
that is u B(E[s]) > E[u B(s)]. Knowing his expected health gives him greater utility
than the utility he would get if he expects to be in state s1 with probability q and in
state s2 with probability 1 − q. On the other hand, the utility function of a monitor,
uM (s) > 0, is increasing and strictly convex, that is E[uM (s)] > uM (E[s]).
For the doctor’s utility function, u D > 0, we assume that it increases as the patient’s
health does, but she is information neutral with respect to the patient’s prospects of
health. This means u D is linear as a function of s, and for simplicity we take u D(s) = s.
In addition, she takes into account the effort she needs to put in every time she transfers
information, as well as the negative atmosphere, i.e. anger registered through a > 0,
and the worry through w > 0 that are created if she does not pass on the full information
to a monitor. Effort, anger and worry are all measured in disutility terms.
It is assumed that uM (E(s) − l) > uM (E(s)) − w. That is, a monitor’s worry is
very big if he accepts the doctor’s recommendation although he realizes that he has not
been given the whole truth about his state of health. He is better off by non-adhering.
Our models relax the assumption of perfect agency, that is the doctor is no longer
assumed to be a perfect agent of the patient. She still wants to maximize the patient’s
utility but she needs to consider other elements as well, such as the effort required to
pass on information to him. Furthermore, the utility function of the doctor is simply
linear in the patient’s state of health.
In Figs. 1 and 2 below, the probability 1 − p denotes the belief of the doctor that
the patient is a blunter, and p her belief that she is dealing with a monitor. On the
other hand, 1 − q1 denotes the belief of a blunter that the doctor has played N T , and
q1 his belief that she has played T . Analogously, we denote the beliefs of a monitor
by 1 − q2 and q2.
The calculations of the payoffs of the doctor and the patient are done by taking into
account their preferences, the strategies chosen by both players, the effort expended and
the probable anger and worry caused. Nature reveals the payoffs after the completion of
the game. If the patient does not adhere, his health will naturally deteriorate. Parameter
l will be non-zero and this will be realized by both the doctor and the patient.
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2.3 The game under imperfect information for the doctor
We analyse the general game where Nature chooses arbitrarily the type of patient that
visits the doctor.1 It follows that she is not sure what type of patient she is facing.
She must decide how much information to pass on, i.e. whether to put in extra effort,
T , or not, N T , taking into account the fact that she does not have exact information
concerning the attitude of the patient towards information. Her ignorance is captured
in Fig. 1 by the two nodes, η1 and η2, in information set I . However, to proceed
with the consultation, she attaches probabilities expressing her beliefs, on the type of
patient that is visiting her.
Hence, she finds herself in I and believes that with probability 1 − p she is at η1
and with 0 < p < 1 at η2. She chooses the same action from both nodes and then the
blunter and the monitor, having their own beliefs, each chooses their own action from
their information sets. Payoffs are reached with the combined probabilities and their
expectations can be calculated. For a PBE, the beliefs of the patients are updated to
become consistent with the action of the doctor. For example, if the doctor plays N T
the beliefs must become q1 = 0 and q2 = 0. The PBEs are described below. They
correspond to the analysis of the graphs.
These beliefs, are expressed through 1− p and p, attached to the nodes, for a blunter
and a monitor, respectively, and allow the analysis to proceed. We note that the beliefs
of the doctor concerning the choices of Nature cannot be updated, through any infor-
mation, as the game unfolds. They cannot be modified by any optimal actions of the
doctor or the patient, and thus cannot be derived by a Bayesian updating. The devel-
opment of the game and the equilibrium solution will depend on their initial values.
Only following repeated consultations (games), which also could provide information
about the development of the state of his health, could the beliefs be adjusted.
Following the doctor’s action, the patient moves. He, of course, knows whether he
is a monitor or a blunter, but without knowing what the doctor has done, he needs to
decide whether to adhere or not to the recommendations. His ignorance implies that
he is constrained to make the same move from both nodes in his information set. We
conduct the analysis under alternative assumptions concerning the parameter l.
Case I. We conduct the analysis under the hypothesis that u B(E[s] − l) > E[u B(s)].
That is, when the doctor plays T, the blunter dislikes the detailed information
regarding his illness so much that he is better off by non-adhering to the doctor’s
recommendation, despite the loss in health from doing so. We consider this to be the
basic case.
First we look at the case when the patient simply follows optimally the doctor. This
highlights the idea of calculation of expected values. There is also interest in it per se,
(comparative statics).
1 If the doctor knows the type of patient, the latter will decide what action to take on the basis of his own
beliefs. The equilibrium decisions will be that she provides the quality of information needed by the patient,
that he has consistent beliefs with the physician’s actions and he adheres (Glycopantis and Stavropoulou
2011).
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If the doctor plays N T the blunter will respond with A and the monitor with N A.
So, the expected utility of the doctor is:
E[N T ] = (1 − p)u D(E[s]) + p(u D(E[s] − l) − a) (1)
If, on the other hand, she plays T , the blunter’s best response is to play N A while
the monitor is better off playing A. So, the expected utility of the doctor if she plays
T is:
E[T ] = (1 − p)(u D(E[s] − l) − 1) + p(E[u D(s)] − 2). (2)
We now consider the decision of the doctor under different values of p, i.e. under
alternative beliefs. For p = 1 it is easy to see that E[N T ] < E[T ]. In other words,
when the doctor believes with certainty that the patient she is diagnosing is a monitor,
it is best for her to put extra effort into supplying all the information to him.
For p = 0 it is again easy to establish that E[N T ] > E[T ]. That is, if the doctor
believes with certainty that the patient is a blunter it is best for her not to supply all
the information. Both these cases were discussed earlier under perfect information.
It follows from the above that there is a value of p, denoted by p∗, for which
E[N T ] = E[T ]. That means that for p = p∗ the doctor is indifferent in putting
special effort or not into describing to the patient his state of health.
Next, we consider the game theory set up in which decisions are interdependent.
Both the doctor and the patient act taking each other’s strategies as fixed. In equi-
librium, nobody has any reason to change and this is Nash equilibrium (NE). When
beliefs are involved we have a PBE.
Case I.1. For values less than this, i.e. p < p∗, and sufficiently close to 0, the doctor,
following her calculations, will be playing N T . In this case, a PBE is {p, N T ; q1 =
0, A; q2 = 0, N A}. This is shown in Fig. 1. The final payoff for the doctor is E =
(1 − p)u D(E[s]) + p(u D(E[s] − l) − a), while for the blunter the final payoff is
EB = (1 − p)u B(E[s]) and for the monitor EM = p(uM (E[s] − l) − a).
For the particular p, the strategies {N T ; A, N A} form a NE: First if the doctor
plays N T the optimal actions {A, N A} follow. Now if the blunter plays A and the
monitor plays N A we have for the doctor E(N T ) = (1− p)u D(E[s])+ p(u D(E[s]−
l) − a) and E(T ) = (1 − p)(u D(E[s]) − 1) + p(u D(E[s] − l) − 2), and for p
sufficiently small we have E(N T ) > E(T ).
Case I.2. For values of p above the indifference point p∗, and sufficiently close to
1, the doctor plays T and a PBE is {p, T ; q1 = 1, N A; q2 = 1, A}. In this case, the
final payoff for the doctor is E = (1 − p)[u D(E[s] − l) − 1] + p[E[u D(s)] − 2].
The equilibrium is shown in Fig. 2. While for the blunter the final payoff is EB =
(1 − p)u B(E[s] − l) for the monitor it is EM = pE(uM [s]).
Now for the particular p, the strategies {T ; N A, A} form a NE. If the doctor plays
T the optimal actions {N A, A} follow. If the blunter plays N A and the monitor plays
A, we have for the doctor E(N T ) = (1 − p)u D(E[s] − l) + p(u D(E[s]) − a) and
E(T ) = (1 − p)(u D(E[s] − l) − 1) + p(E[u D(s)] − 2), and for p near 1, we have
E(N T ) < E(T ).
123
An agency relationship under general conditions of uncertainty...
N
B
T
NA
uD(E[s] − l)
uB(E[s] − l)
uD(E[s])
uB(E[s])
uD(E[s] − l) − 1 E[uD(s)] − 1
E[uB(s)]
uD(E[s] − l) − α
NT
NA
η1
I1 I1 I2 I2
I
η11 η12
I
η2
η21 η
2
2
NA A A NA A
uB(E[s] − l)
uD(E[s] − l) − 2 E[uD(s)] − 2
T NT
uD(E[s]) − α
uM(E[s]) − α − w E[uM(s)]uM(E[s] − l)
M
A
uM(E[s] − l) − α
1 − p p
1 − q1 q1 1 − q2 q2
p1 − p
Fig. 1 The PBE for p < p∗
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Fig. 2 The PBE for p > p∗
With respect to their beliefs the situation is as follows. For q1 = 0 and q2 = 0 a
blunter chooses A and a monitor N A. Also, for beliefs q1 = 1 and q2 = 1 a blunter
chooses N A and a monitor A. These beliefs confirm the actions of the doctor to play
N T .
As a digression, we look again at the case where the doctor decides on her own
and the patient simply responds. Suppose now that p = p∗. The expected utility of
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the doctor is the same irrespective of whether the patient is a blunter or a monitor. We
can assume that she spins a wheel, divided into sectors of size q and 1 − q to decide
whether to supply detailed information or not. The division of the wheel represents
her mixed strategy.
In the general case, the expressions for E[N T ] and E[T ] the multiplicative terms of
the mixed strategy will appear. For 0 < p < 1 the implied general, overall expectation
will be the same as for playing either N T or T .
The doctor’s expectation of playing T or N T depends on the two types of effort
and the psychological elements which affect her. This relation will become exact in
the discussion below.
Suppose that the doctor attaches equal probability to the patient being a blunter
or a monitor. There is no reason why p = 1/2 = p∗. Therefore, p = 1/2 does
not necessarily imply that the doctor will be indifferent between providing and not
providing full information to the patient.
Returning to the general case of interdependent decisions, the discussion above
confirms the idea that an equilibrium means that if all actions and beliefs are revealed
there is no reason for anyone to change any beliefs or actions. The solution concept of
PBE implies consistency between beliefs and strategies. That means that the actions
taken by both parties are consistent with their beliefs and what the other party has
done.
Suppose now that p < p∗ and in particular that p = 0. Then, spinning a wheel
with sectors of size 1 − q and q, the expectation of the doctor will be E1(N T ) =
(1−q)u D(E[s]) and E1(T ) = q((u D(E[s])− l)− 1). The payoff of the blunter will
be E1B(N T ) = (1 − q)u B(E[s]) and E1B(T ) = q(u B(E[s]) − l). The monitor will
get expected payoff 0. For the doctor there will be a q∗1 such that E1(N T ) = E1(T ).
For values q < q∗, and sufficiently close to 0 the doctor will be playing N T and the
PBE will be {p = 0, N T ; q1 = 0, A; q2 = 0, N A; }. The final payoff for the doctor is
E1(N T ) = u D(E[s]) while for the blunter the final payoff is E1B(N T ) = u B(E[s])
and for the monitor 0.
The strategies {N T ; A, N A} form a NE. This is seen by considering the response
of the patient(s) to N T and then of the doctor to {A, N A}. On the other hand, for q
near 1 the doctor will choose T . But this will not lead to a NE because the blunter will
choose N A to which she should respond with N T .
Analogous results can be obtained when p > p∗ and in particular that p = 1.
The relation of the PBE to the resolution that intuitively and from experience one
would expect to the doctor–patient conflict is as follows. Especially, in very serious
illnesses, both agents will try to reveal truthfully their strategies. If open heart operation
is proposed a blunter will not really want to be shown a video, (and such exist),
describing the various stages, and the doctor realizing the situation will refrain from
giving distressing details. On the contrary, a monitor will ask for the video and the
doctor realizing his concerns will spend time and effort to answer detailed questions.
Suppose now that the beliefs of the doctor are such that p = p∗. If the wheel points
to considering the patient as a blunter, then, we obtain the results of Case I.1, above.
On the other hand, if the wheel points to consider the patient as a monitor, then we
obtain the results of Case I.2.
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The discussion above confirms the idea that an equilibrium means that if all actions
and beliefs are revealed there is no reason for anyone to change any beliefs or actions.
The solution concept of PBE implies consistency between beliefs and strategies. That
means that the actions taken by both parties are consistent with their beliefs and what
the other party has done.
The PBE captures the above as equilibria situations, especially when the beliefs
are with certainty. In the case p = 0 and q1 = 0, this corresponds to the case
when the patient, a blunter, does not want to know what exactly will happen during
his heart operation. The doctor understands this, recommends surgery and explains
the procedure in basic steps. The patient appreciates this attitude and accepts the
recommendation.
In the case p = 1 and q2 = 1, the PBE corresponds to the situation when the patient,
a monitor, does want to know exactly what will happen during the operation. The
doctor understands this, recommends surgery and makes maximum effort to explain
the procedure in detail. The patient appreciates the information he receives and accepts
the recommendation.
In both cases above, the firmly held beliefs imply full revelation of the two agents’
attitudes, (preferences), and therefore that nobody has an incentive to lie.2
If the agents lie, this would lead to a disequilibrium situation. Suppose the doctor
realizes that the patient is a blunter but she pretends that he is a monitor and plays
T . The patient can either insist he is a blunter and plays N A or lie, pretend that he
is a monitor and play A. In both cases, the structures of payoffs is such that playing
the PBE strategies would have given a superior outcome. On the other hand, suppose
the doctor realizes that the patient is a monitor but she pretends that he is a blunter
and plays N T . Irrespective of whether the patient reveals his identity or lies the PBE
strategies would have given a superior outcome.
The idea of PBE goes even deeper. If the doctor believes that with high probability
the patient is a blunter then she will not give full details. A blunter understands, and
accepts the recommendation and the outcome is a PBE. On the other hand, if the doctor
believes that with high probability the patient is a monitor then she will give full details.
A monitor understands this and accepts the recommendation and the outcome is again
an equilibrium.
An important point is also the following. In Glycopantis and Stavropoulou (2011)
uncertainty was only on the doctor’s side and the analysis showed that a PBE requires
that she provides the information the patient wants. If the doctor fails to understand
the patient’s preferences the latter will disregard the recommendation.
In the current study, uncertainty is on both parties and the patient may not adhere
to the medical recommendations, not because the doctor did not cover his information
needs, but because he falsely believes she did not do so. It is the interplay of beliefs
which results in the new finding that the same action by the doctor leads to a different
reaction by the patient. The PBE is now reached not only when the patient receives
the information he wants but also if he believes the doctor has actually provided this
information.
2 A question from a reader of our paper helped us formulate this point.
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The implication of a false belief by the patient can be seen, for example, in the
following circumstances. Consider Fig. 1 with p = 0 and suppose that the doctor
predicts correctly a blunter and plays N T . On the other hand, suppose that the patient
believes that the doctor has played T and as a result he does not adhere to the recom-
mendation and plays N A. Then the corresponding two pairs of payoffs at the end of
N A will come up and replace information set I1. But given these payoffs the choice
N T is superior for the doctor and the belief that she has played T is not confirmed.
2.3.1 Implications of repeated consultations
We now consider whether repeated consultations will lead to an equilibrium solution.
The development of the relationship will depend on the initial belief and decision of
the doctor and the belief of the patient about the action taken by the doctor. We shall
discuss only a number of indicative cases:
Case (i). Suppose the doctor believes that most likely the patient is a blunter. Then
her optimal decision will be not to supply very detailed information about his state of
health. The patient knows of course whether he is a blunter or a monitor.
Suppose that a patient realizes that the doctor has not put sufficient effort into
describing his medical condition. Then, as a blunter he will adhere to the medical
recommendation and as a monitor he will not. This will confirm the PBE. A reasonable
outcome is that in repeated consultations the doctor and the patient will change neither
their beliefs nor their actions, and therefore the equilibrium will be stable.
Next, suppose again that the doctor believes that most likely the patient is a blunter.
Then her optimal decision will be not to supply very detailed information about his
state of health. On the other hand, suppose that the patient, as a blunter, believes that
the doctor has not put sufficient effort into describing his medical condition but as a
monitor that he believes that he has. Then the initial position is not an equilibrium one
because the monitor adheres to the recommendation.
If in continuous consultations, the doctor and the blunter have the same beliefs and
actions and the monitor falsely believes that he obtained all the information he wanted
we stay away from the equilibrium which is shown to be unstable. But there is every
chance, by comparing payoffs, that the monitor realizes his mistake and decides to
seek advice elsewhere. In this case, the equilibrium is shown to be stable.
Case (ii). Suppose now that the doctor believes that most likely the patient is a monitor.
Then, her optimal decision will be to supply very detailed information. Suppose that
irrespective of whether he is a blunter or a monitor, he realizes that the doctor has put
sufficient effort into describing his medical condition.
Then, as a blunter he will not adhere to the medical recommendation and as a
monitor he will. This will confirm the PBE. A reasonable outcome is that in repeated
consultations the doctor and the patient will change neither their beliefs nor their
actions, and therefore the equilibrium will be stable.
Next, suppose again that the doctor believes that the patient is a monitor. Then her
optimal decision will be to supply very detailed information about his state of health.
On the other hand, suppose that the patient as a blunter believes that the doctor has not
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described in detail his medical condition but as a monitor that she has. Then the initial
position is not an equilibrium one because the blunter adheres to the recommendation.
If in continuous consultations, the doctor and the monitor have the same beliefs
and actions and the blunter falsely believes that he was not given detailed information,
then we stay away from the equilibrium which is shown to be unstable. But there is
every chance, from the development of his state of health and by comparing payoffs,
that the blunter realizes his mistake and decides to seek advice elsewhere, i.e. not to
adhere to the proposed medication. In this case the equilibrium is shown to be stable.
In general, the most likely outcome is that the agents, either from the beginning or
after a number of consultations, will take the correct decisions which will confirm the
equilibrium.
2.3.2 Comparative statics
The preliminary model when the doctor decides on her own and the patient simply
responds lends itself for the calculation of simple comparative statics results on the
solution p∗.
For the value p∗, we obtain by equating payoffs
pl + pa = (1 − p)[l + 1] + p2. (3)
This is an equilibrium condition of the type that is encountered throughout economic
theory.
When the doctor plays N T there are no i ’s involved and pl + pa measures her
expected loss in utility. When she plays T both 1 and 2 appear in the payoffs and
(1 − p)[l + 1] + p2 measures her expected loss in utility. The equality implies that,
for indifference, the two alternative actions must bring the same outcome.
This implies δp∗/δa < 0, δp∗/δ2 > 0. We also have δp∗/δ1 = (l + a −
2)/(2l + 1 + a − 2)2 which is positive because l + a − 2 > 0. Finally, δp∗/δl =
(a − 1 − 2)/(2l + 1 + a − 2)2 which is inconclusive. This is due to the fact that as
the possible loss in health increases, this affects the utility of both the monitor under
action N T and the blunter under T . This loss is reflected in the doctor’s payoff under
both T and N T . Both these payoffs decrease and the strength with which they do so
depends on the belief of the doctor as to the type of patient. The overall outcome is
inconclusive.
We obtain from these expressions that as 1, 2 increase the doctor will be more
willing to play N T , i.e. to avoid spending too much effort. On the other hand, as a
goes up she will be more willing to play T .
Finally, for the case of p = 1/2 and indifference between N T and T we see that
(3) reduces to
1/2(l + a) = 1/2(l + 1 + 2). (4)
The interpretation is of course that for the doctor the expected disutility of playing
T is equal to the expected disutility if she plays N T . The significance of p = 1/2
is that if there is no sufficient reason to suppose otherwise, equal probability could
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be attached to the patient being a blunter or a monitor, (the principle of insufficient
reason).
The interpretation is that for the doctor the expected disutility of playing T is equal
to the expected disutility if she plays N T .
Summarizing, there is a value p∗ expressing the doctor’s belief such that she is
indifferent between playing N T and T . For p < p∗ she acts in favour of a blunter and
does not provide detailed information. For p > p∗ she acts in favour of a monitor and
provides detailed information. In both cases the patient, a blunter or a monitor, forms
beliefs consistent with the doctor’s actions and responds optimally. The equilibrium
value p∗ changes as the values of the parameters change. Finally, the most likely
outcome of repeated calculations is the stability of the equilibrium decisions.
Case II. We now consider very briefly some implications of assuming u B(E[s]− l) <
E[u B(s)].
This implies that when the doctor plays T, the blunter dislikes detailed information
but not so much that he is prepared to disregard the doctor’s recommendation.
Taking into account the linearity of the doctor’s utility function, we obtain:
E(N T ) = u D(E(s)) − pa − pl, (5)
E(T ) = u D(E(s)) + p1 − 1 − p2. (6)
These equations imply that for indifference between the actions T and N T , we require
pl + pa = (1 − p)1 + p2 (7)
and comparative statics results can be obtained.
The interpretation of (7) is analogous to the one of (3). When the doctor plays
N T the expression pl + pa measures her expected utility loss. When she plays T
there is no parameter l involved. The blunter is not prepared to disregard the doctor’s
recommendation, and (1 − p)1 + p2 measures her expected loss in utility. The
equality implies that for indifference two alternative actions must bring the same
outcome.
Finally, for indifference between the actions under p = 1/2, we obtain
1/2(a + l) = 1/2(1 + 2). (8)
Again, applying the principle of insufficient reason equal probability could be attached
to the patient being a blunter or a monitor.
3 Discussion of findings
This paper uses a non-cooperative game theory approach to explore the doctor–patient
interaction when information affects the emotions of the patient and both parties oper-
ate in an uncertain environment. In particular, it explores how the communication
between the two parties becomes more complicated when not only the doctor is uncer-
tain about the type of the patient she is diagnosing, but also the patient cannot tell how
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much information she has passed on to him. The PBE characterizes the conditions
on optimal strategies and beliefs which guarantee adherence to the doctor’s recom-
mendation. Hence, for adherence both parties must take the correct decisions and also
guess (believe) correctly.
In an earlier exploration uncertainty regarding information preferences relied only
on the doctor’s side (Glycopantis and Stavropoulou 2011). It showed that when the
doctor fails to understand the patient’s preferences the latter will disregard completely
the recommendation.
In this paper, we show that certainty regarding the type of patient is not enough to
achieve adherence. The patient may not adhere to the medical recommendations, not
because the doctor did not cover his information needs, but because he believes she
did not do so. It is the interplay of the uncertainties, expressed as beliefs that produces
the new result that the same action by the doctor leads to a different attitude by the
patient.
The paper also extends previous models in exploring the impact of repeated consul-
tations with the same doctor on the patient’s decision. An equilibrium outcome repeats
itself. If the initial position is not one of equilibrium, then what happens depends on
how the signals received are interpreted. It is possible that the outcomes return to the
equilibrium position or stay away from it. Most likely the agents, after a number of
consultations, will act in a way that will confirm the PBE. Once the consultation is
repeated a few times, beliefs are updated and the two parties get a better understanding
of the type and actions of each other.
Our investigation incorporates elements from both psychology and economics to
help us understand individual behaviours in a more comprehensive and realistic way.
Recent studies are confined to models of a perfect agency relationship which assume
that there is no conflict between the two parties and they do not pay attention to expla-
nations of adherence. In these papers, the only goal of the doctor is the maximization
of the patient’s utility (Caplin and Leahy 2004; Köszegi 2004). We have relaxed this
assumption by allowing the doctor to consider other elements in her utility function,
such as the notion of effort in supplying information. Furthermore, the doctor’s utility
function depends on the patient’s health but not linearly.
4 Concluding remarks
As a possibility, we consider the case when the patient simply responds optimally to
the decisions of the doctor. Our main model explores the case of the doctor–patient
interaction when uncertainty regarding each other’s actions and preferences applies to
both agents. Decisions are taken on the basis of beliefs about the other agent’s actions.
It is important to obtain the PBE strategies and beliefs profiles which guarantee the
desirable outcome of adherence. On this basis we can explain also how non-adherence
actually happens.
The patient may end up rejecting the doctor’s recommendations not because she did
not provided him with the right amount of information regarding his state of health,
but because he mistakenly has formed the wrong impression. Trust, defined here as
the belief in the correctness of the doctor’s decisions, is vital in achieving equilibrium
and adherence to recommendations.
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Significant policy implications arise from our analysis. If the doctor can tell the type
of the patient, she will always provide the right information. Administrative support,
provided, for example, by collecting information on the patient’s preferences, will help
in this direction. The doctor needs also to secure a climate of trust so that the beliefs
of the patient and the decisions of the doctor are positively related. What matters is
that the patient trusts that the doctor has satisfied his particular needs in which case
he will adhere.
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